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FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRIBAL
CUSTOMARY LAW:
THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW
IN TRIBAL COURTS
Concetta R. Tsosie de Haro
INTRODUCTION
History, customs, and language are vital elements of Native American
customary laws. Customary law is law that is given by holy deities that governs a
tribe’s way of life. If federal laws continue to restrict or outright deny the
incorporation of tribal customary law within tribal courts, Native American
peoples will continue to lose their cultural heritage. This article examines the
adverse effects of federal case law and legislation on tribal courts and tribal
courts’ ability to incorporate tribal customary law. The practice of tribal
customary law within tribal courts is critical to the maintenance of tribal
sovereignty. However, recent legislation that expands tribal jurisdiction,
including the Tribal Law and Order Act of 20101 and the reauthorization of the
Violence Against Women Act,2 do not fully embrace tribal customary law. As a
result, the practice of tribal customary law continues to be threatened. Yet, tribes
can utilize aspects of these federal statutes to ensure tribal customary law is
preserved in tribal courts. Thus, this article aims to encourage lawmakers and
practitioners to acknowledge the importance of tribal customary law and to
advocate for its continued use in tribal court. This article also discusses potential
avenues tribes can utilize to expand tribal jurisdiction while protecting their
customary laws, especially customary laws around two-spirit tribal members.
Part I of this article explains the importance of customary law within tribal
courts. Part II examines federal court recognition of tribal customary law as
evident in cases such as Ex Parte Crow Dog3 and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
4
Part II also scrutinizes Supreme Court cases like United States v. Kagama,5
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1
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(b)(6), 124 Stat 2258, 2262-63
(codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.).
2
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 902(d)(1)(A)–(B),
127 Stat. 54, 119.
3
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
4
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
5
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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which upheld the constitutionality of federal legislation and limited the
application of tribal customary law. Part III examines federal statutes like the
Major Crimes Act, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the Tribal Law and Order
Act (TLOA), and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), and the adverse
effects of this legislation on the use of tribal customary law. Part III primarily
focuses on TLOA and VAWA, because TLOA affects a tribe’s ability to
implement VAWA.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW

Tribal customary law is law given from holy deities that governs the
tribe’s way of life including the tribe’s justice systems. Tribal customary law is
fundamental to tribal governance because it originates from tribal cultural
foundations set forth in creation stories and teachings from holy deities.6 It is
important to maintain tribal customary law because it strengthens tribal
communities’ identities and cultural foundations. For example, the StockbridgeMunsee Band of Mohican Indians recognizes that “[h]aving a cultural thread [of
tribal customary law] weaving throughout tribal codes and through tribal court
processes is helping to make tribal communities stronger.”7 Another example of
cultural foundations embodying tribal customary law is given by the Honorable
Robert Yazzie’s8 description of Diné (Navajo) fundamental law:
The Navajo word for ‘law’ is beehaz’aanii. It means something
fundamental, and something that is absolute and exists from the
beginning of time. Navajos believe that the Holy People ‘put it
there for us from the time of beginning’ for better thinking,
planning, and guidance.9
Tribal customary law incorporates tribal histories and cultural foundations
into a tribe’s law.10 These cultural foundations serve as a critical guide for how
we, as tribal peoples, conduct ourselves with the surrounding environment.11 Our
presence must not disrupt the natural harmony of the environment. 12 This is
6

Ezra Rosser, Customary Law: The Way Things Were Codified, 8 TRIBAL L. J. 18, 19 (2008).
STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMMUNITY, Tribal Court, http://www.mohican.com/tribalcourt/
(2015).
8
Chief Justice Robert Yazzie served as the Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court and
is a graduate of the University of New Mexico School of Law.
9
Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 175
(1994).
10
See Rosser, supra note 6, at 27.
11
H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW, 65
(3rd ed. 2007) ( describing how chthonic law takes a holistic view that everything in the
environment is interconnected— that one “cannot understand [chthonic law] without
understanding other things,” and that “there is no separation of law and morals, no separation of
law and anything else” in chthonic legal traditions.).
12
Id. at 68 (stating “the chthonic legal order is not simply compatible with chthonic religion”
rather it is “it is shot through with [chthonic religion].” Further stating that chthonic legal tradition
“is a divine legal tradition, and the role one plays is a divine role.”).
7
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evident in many tribes, and prime examples can be found in the laws of the Diné
Nation.
The Diné concept of hozho provides an example of how tribal customary
law serves as a foundational guide for tribal members. Diné customary law, as
codified, states, “[i]t is the right and freedom of the people that there always be
holistic education values and principles underlying the purpose of living in
balance with all creation, walking in beauty, and making a living.” 13 These
concepts describe hozho, the Diné concept of “the perfect state.”14 This perfect
state is where the individual, the community, and nature are in harmony and
balanced. The concept of hozho directly contrasts with the westernized concepts
of law. The Diné concept of law is a restorative win-win situation15 whereas in
western law, the goal “is to punish wrongdoers and teach them a lesson.” 16
Achieving a win-win situation for both parties ensures restorative justice and
hozho (harmony) is maintained within the tribal community and their courts.
In an interview with a Pueblo Tribal Court Judge, the Judge explained the
pros and cons of utilizing tribal customary law within tribal courts. 17 For
example, the Judge noted that adjudicating family disputes in their tribal courts
using western law did not bring the families together. This is where the use of
tribal customary law was helpful. The Judge said customary laws bring families
together, but their Pueblo Court was not set up to bring criminal defendants
together to work out their differences.18
Professor Ezra Rosser19 once stated that customary law “naturally appeals
to many tribal courts, not only because it allows tribal justice to accord with tribal
society as shown through traditions, but also because the use of customary law is
thought to reinforce the very same traditions.”20 Thus, the use of customary law
and traditions reinforces the need for recognition of these important cultural
values.
A prime example of the importance of recognizing cultural values in tribal
courts from the Navajo Nation is the use of hazhó’ógo. “Hazhó’ógo is not manmade law, but rather a fundamental tenet informing us how we must approach
each other as individuals.” 21 This fundamental tenet requires Navajos to take
great care when interacting with each other. 22 Without hazhó’ógo, we make

13

NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 204 (2009).
Yazzie, supra note 9, at 175.
15
Id. at 182.
16
Id. at 178.
17
Interview with Anonymous, Pueblo Tribal Court Judge, at the Nat’l Am. Indian Court Judge’s
Ass’n (NAICJA) Nat’l Tribal Judicial & Court Pers. Conference, in Catoosa, Okla. (Oct. 9, 2014)
(judicial interviewees choose to remain anonymous because they do not want their personal beliefs
affecting their judicial posting).
18
Interview with Anonymous, Tribal Court Judge, in Catoosa, Okla. (Oct. 9, 2014).
19
Ezra Rosser is a Professor of Law at American University College of Law and has written
extensively on federal Indian law. Professor Rosser spent some of his childhood on the Diné
Nation.
20
See Rosser, supra note 6, at 19.
21
Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, 5 Am. Tribal L. 473, 479 (Dec. 16, 2004).
22
Id. at 480.
14
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rushed and uninformed decisions that can have negative consequences. 23 This is
why Navajo Courts require police officers to exercise hazhó’ógo when processing
criminal defendants.24 Restorative cultural tools such as hazhó’ógo must continue
to be incorporated by tribal courts because it is critical for tribal justice systems to
align with their respective tribes’ belief systems and community goals.
But the use of customary law requires more than knowing the tribe’s
traditions; this requires individuals to be present within the community. Tribal
court judges who live within the community understand the importance of
customary law. For example, Betsy McDougal talked about her brother’s role
within her tribal community. Ms. McDougal’s brother serves as a tribal court
judge. Ms. McDougal said his role is equal to that of an elder when he sits on the
bench. When cases are tried before him, he speaks to the parties about tribal life
lessons and what the tribal community expects of its members.25 Ms. McDougal
said it was important for her brother “to maintain his cultural foundation from the
bench.” 26 As such, he stays active within the community by participating in
sweats and drumming. He is highly respected within the community. She noted
that her brother educates individuals who appear in court about how their conduct
is not consistent with the tribe’s traditional teachings. 27 Those traditional
teachings contribute to a strong cultural foundation.
Speaking the tribe’s language in court reinforces this strong cultural
foundation. This Pueblo tribal court judge stated that it is important to know your
language when using customary law. The same Judge said he addresses the court
in his native language to honor and respect each individual in the judicial
process.28 He says the native language helps set the tone within the courtroom.
Further, this Pueblo tribal court judge emphasized that when the tribal court is
opened with respect, the fighting parties will reach a resolution. The Judge
explained that this respect comes from being a member of the Pueblo and
understanding the language, the culture, and the teachings from the elders.29 By
continuing to incorporate tribal customary law in the court setting, courts achieve
harmony, win-win situations, and retain their cultural practices. The weaving of
tribal customary law within tribal court practices ensures the language, culture,
and teachings from the elders remain present in the community.
II.

SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW

Historically, tribes incorporated their cultural values by applying
customary law to civil and criminal conflicts. The United States Supreme Court

23

Id.
Id.
25
Interview with Betsy McDougal, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians Member, in
Catoosa, Okla. (Oct. 9, 2014).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Interview with Anonymous, Pueblo Tribal Court Judge, at the Nat’l Am. Indian Court Judge’s
Ass’n (NAICJA) Nat’l Tribal Judicial & Court Pers. Conference supra note 17.
29
Id.
24
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acknowledged the practice of tribal customary law in cases like Ex Parte Crow
Dog30 and in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.31
In Ex Parte Crow Dog, the Supreme Court examined whether the United
States had jurisdiction over a crime that occurred between two Indians within
reservation boundaries.32 Crow Dog and Spotted Tail were members of the Brulé
Sioux Band.33 Crow Dog murdered Spotted Tail and was tried under Brulé Sioux
laws.34 Employing its customary law, the Tribe ordered Crow Dog to pay Spotted
Tail’s family in blankets and horses as reparations for the murder.35 However,
Indian Agents believed Crow Dog was not punished for his crime and arrested
and imprisoned him.36 Crow Dog’s case came before the United States Supreme
Court on a writ of habeas corpus for illegal imprisonment.37 The Supreme Court
held that the United States did not have jurisdiction over the crime because it
occurred within Indian Country between two Indians. 38 This case is notable
because the federal courts acknowledged and upheld the Brulé Sioux’s right to
exercise their own tribal customary laws. In Ex Parte Crow Dog, the Supreme
Court demonstrated this acknowledgment and acceptance of the traditional
customary law when it quoted Justice Miller from United States v. Joseph:
The tribes for whom the act of 1834 was made were those semiindependent tribes whom our government has always recognized
as exempt from our laws, whether within or without the limits of
an organized State or Territory, and, in regard to their domestic
government, left to their own rules and traditions, in whom we
have recognized the capacity to make treaties, and with whom the
governments, State and national, deal with few exceptions only, in
their national or tribal character, and not as individuals.39
Despite the Supreme Court’s support of the use of tribal customary law in
Crow Dog, Congress believed the Brulé Sioux’s customary law was not a
sufficient form of justice under western lens of justice. 40 Thus, in a direct
response to the Crow Dog decision, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in
1885.41

30

Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978).
32
Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 568.
36
Id. at 557.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 572.
39
Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 618 (1877)).
40
U.S Dep’t of Justice, The Major Crimes Act – 18 U.S.C. § 1153, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL
679, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-679-major-crimes-act-18-usc-1153
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
41
See generally Offenses committed within Indian Country, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885) (18 U.S.C. §
1153 removes tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed within Indian County involving murder,
31
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After Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act, the constitutionality of the
legislation was questioned in United States v. Kagama. In Kagama, the Supreme
Court examined whether the United States could exercise jurisdiction over major
crimes committed between two Indians within reservation boundaries. 42 The
decision from Kagama again restricted the application of tribal customary law by
upholding the Major Crimes Act. In Kagama, two Indians murdered another
Indian within reservation boundaries. 43 Since murder fell within the federal
district court’s jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act,44 the Supreme Court held
that tribes did not have jurisdiction to apply their own traditional customary laws
to major crimes taking place within the bounds of their sovereign lands.45 In
explaining its rationale, the Supreme Court stated:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because
it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce
its laws on all the tribes.46
Because Congress diminished tribal power, the Supreme Court held the
Major Crimes Act was a constitutional exercise of Congressional power because
the tribes are considered “within the geographical limits of the United States.”47
In other words, because the tribes are within the limits of the United States, the
tribes are under the political control of the federal government.48 That political
control allows Congress to make laws affecting the tribes.49
While the Kagama decision restricted the use of traditional customary law,
the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of tribal customary law in later
cases like Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
the Supreme Court examined whether the Santa Clara Pueblo tribal customary
laws violated tribal members’ equal protection rights under the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA). 50 This case arose when the Santa Clara Pueblo used its
customary law to deny tribal enrollment and inheritance rights to the children of a
female tribal member who married outside the tribe.51 The United States District
manslaughter, kidnapping, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, and robbery, and
gives jurisdiction to the United States).
42
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376 (1886).
43
Id.
44
See generally Offenses committed within Indian Country, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1885).
45
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
46
Id. at 384-85.
47
Id. at 379.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 380.
50
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978). See infra Part III, Section B.
51
Id. at 51.
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Court held that the Pueblo’s customary law of restricting inheritance rights and
tribal enrollment violated Section 1302(a)(1) of ICRA.52 However, the Supreme
Court reversed and upheld tribal customary law through the doctrine of sovereign
immunity by stating:
Congress may also have considered that resolution of statutory
issues under § 1302, and particularly those issues likely to arise in
a civil context, will frequently depend on questions of tribal
tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better
position to evaluate than federal courts. 53
The Supreme Court further acknowledged the importance of tribal
tradition and custom by agreeing with the federal district court’s statement that
the tribe’s membership rule reflected “traditional values of patriarchy still
significant in tribal life.” 54
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Supreme Court highlighted the importance of
tribal customary law and “the right of the Indians to govern themselves.” 55 The
Supreme Court also stated, “[s]ubject[ing] a dispute arising on the reservation
among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for
themselves may undermine the authority of the tribal court.” 56 Although previous
cases like United States v. Kagama restricted the application of tribal customary
law, Santa Clara Pueblo demonstrated that the Supreme Court still recognizes the
importance of tribes’ ability to govern their own people with their own tribal
customary laws.
III.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION RESTRICTING TRIBAL CUSTOMARY LAW

Most predominantly, the Major Crimes Act, the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), and the recent 2013
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) have had adverse
effects on tribal customary law. The Major Crimes Act was one of the first
restrictions on the application of customary laws. ICRA continued to restrict the
application of customary law within tribal courts by imposing western legal
concepts. Even “[m]odern federal efforts [like TLOA and VAWA that] are really
designed to address the ill effects of colonization and to restore to tribes some of
the governmental powers that existed prior to colonization by expanding tribal

52

Id. at 54; See generally Constitutional Rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (2010) (stating that tribes
have the authority to “make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or by
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition for a redress of grievances …”).
53
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 71.
54
Id. at 54.
55
Id. at 59 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)).
56
Id. at 59 (quoting Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-8 (1976)).
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court jurisdiction” 57 have come at the price of limiting tribes’ ability to apply
tribal customary law within tribal courts.
A. The Major Crimes Act: The Beginning of Federal Restrictions on
Tribal Courts
As discussed in Part II, 58 the Major Crimes Act was one of the first
legislative acts to limit the application of customary law in tribal courts. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog and “strong pressure by the
Indian agents and the Indian Service, in 1885 Congress enacted the Federal Major
Crimes Act.”59 One reason for the enactment of the Major Crimes Act is that
Congress did not consider tribal customary law as a valid legal institution.
Further, “the Congressional Record reflects the belief that the resolution of the
incident in accordance with tribal customary law amounted to ‘no law at all.’”60
The use of tribal customary law purportedly demonstrated to Congress that the
tribes lacked the ability to convict criminals within their communities. Congress
believed Indians who commit crimes within the United States should be convicted
under United States laws.61
Therefore, the Major Crimes Act granted federal courts jurisdiction over
serious crimes that occur within Indian Country.62 Distinct federal statutes define
serious offenses to include murder, manslaughter, and other felonies. 63 “In
explicitly allowing the federal government to prosecute offenses between Indians
within Indian country, the Act [caused] an avulsive change in federal Indian
policy” by taking away tribes’ ability to punish serious offenders in Indian
Country under their own tribal laws.64 Under the Major Crimes Act, tribes no
longer had the ability to protect their communities. Even if a tribe still retained
criminal jurisdiction, there was “no explicit recognition of Indian custom in the
criminal law of the United States.” 65 By enacting the Major Crimes Act,
57

Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. Rev.
779, 843 (2006).
58
See discussion supra Part III.
59
Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
113, 169 (2002).
60
M. Brent Leonhard, Returning Washington P.L. 280 Jurisdiction to Its Original Consent Based
Grounds, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 663, 672 (2012).
61
See 16 CONG. REC. 934 (1885).
62
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1885) (establishing that “[a]ny Indian who commits against
the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a felony assault
under section 113, an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony
child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within
the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing
any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”).
63
U.S Dep’t of Justice, The Major Crimes Act – 18 U.S.C. § 1153, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL
679, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-679-major-crimes-act-18-usc-1153
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
64
Washburn, supra note 57, at 809.
65
Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (ALRC Report 31), AUSTL. L. REFORM COMMISSION
(ALRC) 404 (June 12, 1986), http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-31.
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Congress attempted “to replace tribal norms and processes with federal norms and
processes that Congress deemed superior.”66 Thus, the Major Crimes Act “was a
simple and straightforward act of colonization”67 with the overall goal “to achieve
assimilation.”68 This “racism and explicit discounting of the customary laws of
tribal nations is reflected throughout much of the Act’s legislative history.”69
Hence, the passage of the Major Crimes Act significantly intruded into
tribal courts’ ability to exercise their traditional customary law in all cases
involving serious crimes. Unfortunately, this contempt for tribal customary law
continued with the Indian Civil Rights Act.
B. Indian Civil Rights Act: Restricting Customary Law to Protect
Individual Rights
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) also restricted application of
customary laws within tribal courts.70 ICRA extended a tailored version of the
Bill of Rights to tribal members and imposed civil rights restrictions on tribal
governments.71 Those restrictions were to protect individual tribal members from
the rampant corruption within tribal governments.72 ICRA, as a component of
tribal court criminal procedure, “effectively squelched many traditional ways of
addressing criminal justice by requiring tribal governments to adjudicate criminal
justice in a manner nearly identical to the federal and state governments.” 73
Because of the continued attempts to assimilate tribal courts, some tribes resisted
ICRA implementation.
For example, Pueblos in New Mexico objected to ICRA, believing the act
would diminish or eliminate tribal customs.74 These Pueblos objected to the right
to a jury trial because the Pueblos believed it would be difficult to find impartial
jurors within their close-knit communities.75 Similarly, the Ute and Hopi tribes
also submitted testimony regarding their concerns of conflict between tribal
customs and ICRA.76 The Utes and Hopis were specifically worried about the
candor of the court and turning tribal court proceedings into a game of who can
play “the white man’s justice [game]” best.77 Another concern from the tribes
was transitioning tribal courts from a non-adversarial system to an adversarial
system.78
66

Washburn, supra note 57, at 837.
Id. at 809.
68
Id. at 828.
69
Leonhard, supra note 60, at 672.
70
See generally Constitutional Rights, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2010).
71
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: A REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1 (1991); See generally Constitutional Rights, 25 U.S.C. §
1302.
72
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 5.
73
See Washburn, supra note 57, at 822.
74
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 71, at 8.
75
Id. at 9.
76
Id. at 8.
77
Id. at 9.
78
Id. at 10.
67
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During the implementation of ICRA, some “Indian courts suffered from a
lack of legal infrastructure.”79 Because tribal law was “generally unavailable to
judges, litigants, and the public,” 80 tribes without tribal constitutions relied on
ICRA and precedent from state and federal courts to decide tribal cases.81 The
lack of legal infrastructure and the transition from non-adversarial approaches to a
more adversarial court setting had negative effects. Overall, many tribal courts
“changed into more formal and less traditional entities ten years after ICRA’s
enactment.”82 This change caused tribal customary law to play “a smaller role in
court proceedings since the Act.”83 Because this change diminished the role of
tribal customary law in tribal court, tribal courts shifted from restorative justice to
adversarial justice systems. The adversarial justice system does not focus on
restoring harmony to the community, rather it focuses on punishment. Thus, the
ICRA interference weakened tribal courts and “inadvertently open[ed] the door to
state and federal interference with internal tribal affairs”84 through the Tribal Law
and Order Act.
C. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010: The Cost to Expand Tribal
Court Jurisdiction
Like earlier case law and legislation, the Tribal Law and Order Act
(TLOA) limited tribes’ ability to use customary law in tribal courts. TLOA85 was
recently enacted to address jurisdictional shortcomings created by “the
complexity of [the tribal and federal judicial] system” employed in Indian country
that had “contributed to a crisis of violent crime on many Indian reservations that
has persisted for decades.”86 TLOA was created to address the concern that the
“system of justice on Indian reservations [lacked] coordination, accountability,
and adequate and consistent funding.”87 Thus, in hopes of “empower[ing] tribal
governments with the authority, resources, and information necessary to safely

79

Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the
Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 66 (2012).
80
Id. at 77.
81
Id. at 66.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 68.
84
Id. at 70.
85
See generally, Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-211, § 202 (b), 124 Stat. 2258,
2263 (establishing that the “purposes of this title are (1) to clarify the responsibilities of Federal,
State, tribal, and local governments with respect to crimes committed in Indian country; (2) to
increase coordination and communication among Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement
agencies; (3) to empower tribal governments with the authority, resources, and information
necessary to safely and effectively provide public safety in Indian country; (4) to reduce the
prevalence of violent crime in Indian country and to combat sexual and domestic violence against
American Indian and Alaska Native women; (5) to prevent drug trafficking and reduce rates of
alcohol and drug addiction in Indian country; and (6) to increase and standardize the collection of
criminal data and the sharing of criminal history information among Federal, State, and tribal
officials responsible for responding to and investigating crimes in Indian country.”).
86
S. REP. NO. 111-93, at 1 (2009).
87
Id.
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and effectively provide public safety in Indian country,” TLOA was signed into
law on July 29, 2010. 88
1. The True Costs of Implementing TLOA
While TLOA was intended to expand the jurisdiction of tribal courts,
including their ability to use tribal customary law in criminal cases, the use of
tribal customary law in tribal courts continues to be limited by the high costs of
TLOA implementation. As Professor Angela Riley indicated, “costs stand as the
greatest barrier to making any kind of meaningful change in criminal justice in
Indian country.”89 TLOA requires that “a sovereign must bear the burden of
ensuring all of these various [justice] systems are operational.” This means
TLOA requires tribes to bear all the costs to expand tribal jurisdiction.90 But
many tribes do not have adequate funding to update their tribal courts to meet the
TLOA requirements. This lack of funding is one of the primary reasons some
tribes have difficulty integrating TLOA into their current tribal judicial systems.
One major financial burden exists under Section 234(c) of TLOA.91
Section 234(c)(2) states the tribal government must provide the defendant with a
defense attorney who is licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction of the United
States.92 Sections 234(c)(3)(A) and (B) also require the presiding judge to have
sufficient legal training and be licensed to practice law.93 These requirements
mean hiring only attorneys who are law trained and have passed a bar exam. As
the pay rate can be very high for individuals who are legally trained and licensed
to practice law, offering a comparable salary is difficult and costly for a tribe that
has little economic infrastructure. While there are numerous grants to offset the
costs of drug enforcement and incarceration under TLOA,94 there is unfortunately
little funding for the required legal counsel.95
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In fact, “there is no single, well-defined funding program devoted
exclusively to helping tribal courts meet TLOA’s requirements.” 96 TLOA has
been amended to require legal assistance grants under 25 U.S.C. Section 33 to
help offset defense counsel costs, but legal assistance grant money can only be
used to pay for state licensed criminal defense counsel. 97 Grants are not a
sustainable source of revenue to offset costs for TLOA implementation. Grants
are competitive and in short supply. As it is, tribes already “face a number of
barriers to raising revenue in traditional ways” and the high costs of providing
state licensed law trained tribal court judges and defense attorneys are an
insurmountable burden that prevent tribes from using the expanded TLOA
jurisdiction. 98 Because TLOA requires state-licensed defense attorneys,
implementation comes at the expense of some of tribes’ greatest resources. Those
resources are the tribal court lay judges and tribal lay advocates. Those
individuals utilize tribal customary law to ensure harmony remains in their
communities. The TLOA defense attorney requirement has ambiguous language
regarding licensing. This ambiguity appears to leave the door open for tribal lay
advocates, but this unclear language also could create a dangerous precedent to
exclude them.
Section 234(c)(2) of TLOA states that a tribal court defense attorney must
be “licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction of the United States,” 99 but
provides no specific language as to whether tribal lay advocates can practice as
defense attorneys under TLOA. Many tribal courts allow lay advocates to
practice within their courts. Lay advocates are admitted to practice in tribal courts
and advocate for parties who appear before tribal courts, but lay advocates are not
trained in state law schools or bar-licensed by any specific state. 100 Like
practicing attorneys, lay advocates must meet the tribe’s criteria to practice in
tribal courts, and adhere to the same ethical code as licensed attorneys.101 Lay
advocates are a great benefit for tribal communities and should be allowed to
advocate for tribal clients under expanded criminal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the benefits of tribal lay advocates
when it stated, “[k]nowledgeable lay advocates may offer real advantages to their
clients in a criminal court that applies traditional tribal principles to its legal
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decision making.”102 Thus, lay advocates are important because they have deep
knowledge and experience with customary law. Much of this knowledge and
experience stems from tribal lay advocates residing in their own tribal
communities, and their fluency in the tribe’s language. This cultural knowledge is
crucial in tribal court practice because tribal courts typically incorporate tribal
customary law with western legal concepts. For these reasons, instead of
imposing a costly requirement of law trained attorneys, TLOA should emphasize
the importance of tribal lay advocates within tribal courts. Furthermore,
the
ambiguous language in TLOA may cause dangerous precedence that could
negatively impact tribal lay advocates and their ability to practice in tribal courts.
In United States v. Alone, a federal district court examined whether tribal lay
advocates are now considered licensed attorneys under TLOA.103 In Alone, an
Oglala Sioux man was charged with sexual abuse and asserted that the tribal lay
advocate was licensed in federal and tribal court.104 The defendant argued that
TLOA changed the status of the tribal lay advocate to a licensed attorney. 105 The
federal district court held that there was no specific provision of TLOA to support
his argument.106 Moreover, the Court stated, “there is a clear distinction between
licensed legal counsel and lay representation under the Sixth Amendment.” 107
The Court also stated that, “the United States Supreme Court did not extend the
Sixth Amendment to encompass the right to be represented before the bar of a
court by a layman.”108 Alone is an example of how the ambiguous language in
TLOA adversely affects the status of tribal lay advocates. If tribal lay advocates
are excluded from practicing in their tribal courts, it could have a negative effect
on the continued use of tribal customary law.
2. The Harmony of Incorporating Customary Law into TLOA
One avenue within TLOA to incorporate tribal customary law is Section
211, the TLOA federal accountability and coordination section. Tribes can use
the federal accountability and coordination section of TLOA to ensure the
incorporation of customary law with enhanced sentencing. Under Section 211,
the Office of Justice Services is required to communicate “with tribal leaders,
tribal community and victims’ advocates, tribal justice officials, indigent defense
representatives, and residents of Indian country on a regular basis regarding
public safety and justice concerns facing tribal communities.” 109 This
requirement means the Office of Justice Services must conduct “meaningful and
timely consultation[s] with tribal leaders and tribal justice officials in the
102
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development of regulatory policies and other actions that affect public safety and
justice in Indian country.” 110 These consultations could serve as avenues for
tribes to advocate for the use of their own customary laws in sentencing
individuals while adhering to TLOA requirements.
Tribal customary law may also be incorporated through alternative forms
of punishment under TLOA. Under section 234(d)(2), a tribal court may require a
defendant “to serve another alternative form of punishment, as determined by the
tribal court judge pursuant to tribal law.”111 This statement opens the door for
tribal courts to integrate tribal customary forms of punishment.
The Tulalip Tribal Court is an example of a tribe that successfully
integrated customary law as alternative sentencing programs into its justice
system while working under the TLOA constraints. The Tulalip Tribes are within
the Public Law 280 State of Washington. Public Law 280 (PL-280) was enacted
in 1953 and allowed states to exercise criminal jurisdiction within parts of Indian
country.112 Though the Tulalip Tribes consented to state jurisdiction,113 the tribes
fought to regain authority over crimes committed within their reservation. In
2001, the Tulalip Tribes successfully regained jurisdiction over criminal
misdemeanors and have concurrent federal jurisdiction over criminal felonies.114
After completing the transfer, the Tulalip Tribes implemented TLOA
provisions to regain criminal jurisdiction and take advantage of enhanced
sentencing. The Tulalip Tribes have developed their own justice program that
incorporates their customary laws. The Tulalip Tribal Code’s choice of law
provision addresses how customary law will apply within their tribal courts.
Specifically, under Chapter 2.05.030(2) the Tulalip Tribal Code states:
The Tulalip Tribal Courts shall apply the laws and ordinances of
the Tulalip Tribes, including the custom laws of the Tribes, to all
matters coming before the Courts; provided, that where no
applicable Tulalip Tribal law, ordinance, or custom law can be
found, the Courts may utilize, in the following order, the
procedural laws of other Federally recognized Indian tribes,
Federal statutes, Federal common law, State common law, and
State statutes as guides to decisions of the Courts (emphasis
added).115
In discussing the importance of utilizing tribal customary law in
alternative sentencing programs, Chief Judge Theresa Pouly of the Tulalip Tribal
110
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Court stated, “Tulalip wants to maintain that restorative justice code [and] at the
same time balance the extended jurisdiction to address really serious crimes.”116
The Tulalip Tribes maintained their customary laws and cultural foundations by
creating “a judicial system that Tulalip citizens can trust and that also helps
offenders to recover rather than just throwing them away.”117
This restorative judicial system is known as the Tulalip Tribal Court
Alternative Sentencing Program. The Tulalip Tribal Court Alternative Sentencing
Program incorporates tribal customs into sentences, with successful results. The
Tulalip Tribes specifically wanted to exert more control over their growing
domestic violence and drug use problems. Part of that control included bringing
in traditional values and a focus on “restoration, recovery, healing, community,
and the family” through the application of customary law based sentences.118 The
program “melds indigenous and therapeutic jurisprudence, [and goes] beyond just
placing offenders in jail.”119 Instead of having offenders serve jail sentences, the
Tulalip Tribal Court Alternative Sentencing Program provides many services to
support and rehabilitate offenders. These services include mental health
treatment, meetings with elders, and vocational classes. 120 This alternative
sentencing program allows community input to restore a healthy community and
the individual.121 Based on 2006 statistics, twenty-five percent of the participants
did not reoffend and the Tulalip police chief reported a drop in violent crime and
gang activity.122
Despite the TLOA restrictions, the Tulalip Tribes found alternative
avenues to incorporate tribal customary law. Tribes can look to the Tulalip as a
successful model of adopting TLOA and can implement similar models of
alternative forms of sentencing. While TLOA potentially can have an adverse
effect on a tribe’s ability to continue practicing its customary law, the Tulalip
Tribes demonstrated that implementing TLOA does not mean a tribe must stop
practicing its customary law in the courtroom. As the Tulalip Tribal Court
Alternative Sentencing Program successfully harmonizes TLOA jurisdiction and
tribal customary law in order to best serve the Tulalip tribal community, other
tribes can use Tulalip’s alternative sentencing model to seek alternative avenues
to ensure their customary laws have a place within the tribal courts.
D. Violence Against Women Act: Unanswered Questions of Protecting
Our Sisters
The recent reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
also adversely affects the use of tribal customary law. Title IX of this Act applies
to Indian women within Indian country. The purpose of this law was to increase
116

Felicia Fonseca, Feds Highlight Efforts To Curb Reservation Crime, NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM.
INDIANS, http://tloa.ncai.org/news.cfm?view=display&aid=57 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
117
See Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev, supra note 114, at 1.
118
Id. at 3.
119
Id. at 1.
120
INDIAN LAW AND ORDER COMM’N, supra note 90, at 134.
121
See Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev, supra note 114, at 2.
122
Id.

15

16

TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17

awareness of violence against Native American women and enhance the response
to violence against them.123 Specifically, Title IX of VAWA allows tribes to have
jurisdiction over Native and non-Native individuals who commit domestic
violence crimes, dating violence crimes, and protection order violations within
Indian country.
These amendments to VAWA were made based on the high need for
protection of domestic violence victims in Indian country. Native Americans are
2.5 times more likely than all other races to experience sexual assault crimes, and
one in three Indian women reports having been raped during her lifetime. 124 The
Justice Department is responsible for prosecuting the most serious crimes that fall
under the Major Crimes Act, 125 but turns down two-thirds of sexual assault
cases. 126 There are many reasons for these low prosecution rates including,127
lack of evidence, lack of resources, and lack of communication between the
federal government and tribal authorities.128
In providing support for the passing of VAWA Senator Franken stated,
“We all know too well that Indian women are victimized more than any other
population.” 129 VAWA acknowledged that “[v]iolence in Indian country is
compounded by a systemic failure to prosecute offenders.” 130 Like TLOA,
VAWA provides extended sentencing abilities for tribes. But, if tribes want to
take advantage of the expanded jurisdiction, tribes must meet the definition of a
“participating tribe.”
1. The Difficulties of Qualifying as a Participating Tribe
To qualify as a participating tribe under VAWA, the tribe must satisfy the
due process protections in TLOA. 131 As discussed above, one of those due
process requirements is to provide indigent defendants with effective legal
counsel.132 Under TLOA, legal counsel is any attorney licensed to practice law in
any jurisdiction of the United States.133 As previously stated, tribal lay advocates
still could be excluded, and implementation of the TLOA requirements for
expanded jurisdiction is expensive.134
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The TLOA defense attorney requirement has ambiguous language
regarding licensing. This ambiguity appears to leave the door open for tribal lay
advocates, but this unclear language also could create a dangerous precedent to
exclude them. Exclusion of tribal lay advocates from tribal courts in conjunction
with VAWA’s expanded domestic violence jurisdiction is risky. Without tribal
lay advocates, domestic violence victims may not be able to attain justice.
Because Alone can affect the attorney requirements in TLOA as detailed
above, 135 it can also affect VAWA and prevent tribal lay advocates from
practicing within tribal courts that elect to implement both statutes. More
precedent like Alone can also prevent tribes from qualifying as a participating
tribe because the tribe cannot afford to employ a state licensed attorney. Instead
of utilizing the tribe’s greatest resource of tribal lay advocates, domestic violence
will continue to adversely affect the community.
2. Tribal Customary Law Can Be Incorporated into Tribal
Courts through Tribal Coalitions
If a tribe does not qualify as a participating tribe to utilize special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction, one solution to combat the domestic violence
epidemic while incorporating tribal customary law is through a tribal coalition.
Tribal coalitions are non-profit, non-governmental organizations that provide
culturally appropriate services to domestic violence victims.136 Tribal coalitions
incorporate tribal customary laws to help combat domestic violence within the
community. An example of such a coalition is the Seven Dancers Coalition in
New York which is a community-oriented project that works to better the lives of
Native American Women and help individuals live free of violence.137
Tribal coalitions can assist tribes in “developing and promoting state,
local, and tribal legislation and policies that enhance best practices for responding
to violent crimes against Indian women, including the crimes of domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, sex trafficking, and stalking.”138 Tribal
coalitions have the ability to implement tribal customs into their awareness and
rehabilitation efforts. If a coalition were to create a domestic violence survivor
program that incorporated tribal customs, the experience might assist survivors in
achieving “an enhanced sense of well-being” and “raise their awareness of the
various aspects of domestic violence.” 139 This awareness reaffirms cultural
teachings and ensures the continuation of tribal customary laws.
Under VAWA, there are grant programs available to fund tribal coalitions.
Section 902(d)(1)(A) gives the Attorney General the power to award grants “to
tribal coalitions for purposes of increasing awareness of domestic violence and
135
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sexual assault against Indian women.”140 The organization must “meet the criteria
of a tribal coalition” under Section 3(a)(35). 141 This provision defines a tribal
coalition as “an established nonprofit, nongovernmental Indian organization,
Alaska Native organization, or a Native Hawaiian organization” that:
(A) provides education, support, and technical assistance to
member Indian service providers in a manner that enables those
member providers to establish and maintain culturally appropriate
services, including shelter and rape crisis services, designed to
assist Indian women and the dependents of those women who are
victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and
stalking; and
(B) is comprised of board and general members that are
representative of—
(i) the member service providers describe in subparagraph
(A); and
(ii) the tribal communities in which the services are being
provided.142
Thus, with VAWA funding, tribal coalitions can combat domestic
violence by incorporating tribal customary laws to achieve a restorative effect and
reduce violence against women in Indian country. Tribal coalitions are great
avenues for tribal lay advocates to help their community members if domestic
violence victims are unable to use tribal lay advocates’ services in tribal court.
The use of a tribal coalition can help tribes and tribal lay advocates ensure the
continued use of tribal customary law within their tribal communities.
3. The Protection of Two-Spirit Individuals and Same Sex
Couples
While VAWA seeks to protect Native American women from domestic
violence in Indian country and has the potential to incorporate customary law in
doing so, it leaves open questions about tribal protection of relationships between
two spirit individuals. When examining the requirements for tribal jurisdiction
under VAWA, the ambiguous language in the Act invites questions about how
tribes can protect transgender individuals or spouses of same-sex relationships.
The 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA states that special domestic violence
criminal jurisdiction extends to individuals regardless of sexual orientation. 143
However, that ambiguous language still leaves a loophole. Tribal courts may not
be able to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians in same-sex relationships with
tribal members if the tribe does not acknowledge the relationship as a qualifying
relationship.
Thus, VAWA’s vague language as to whether same-sex
140
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relationships qualify under the Act can have unintended consequences that lead to
less protection of our two-spirited individuals.
Another term for transgendered individuals is two-spirited. 144 The
statistics of hate crimes against two-spirited individuals of color are horrific.
Two-spirited women of color are 1.6 times more likely to experience physical
violence.145 They are also 1.8 times more likely to experience sexual violence.146
Moreover, two-spirited women are 2.9 times more likely to experience
discrimination when seeking help.147 Eighty-five percent of two-spirited Native
American women are sexually assaulted and seventy-eight percent reported
physical assault.148 These statistics demonstrate a need to offer better protection
for our two-spirited sisters. Yet, the failure to incorporate tribal customary law in
VAWA does not provide a clear answer to how can our tribes help protect all of
their members?
25 U.S.C. Section 1304 of VAWA, provides a criteria list for qualifying
relationships that meet VAWA’s protections. This includes the length of the
relationship, the type of relationship, and the frequency of interaction. 149
“Spouse” or “intimate partner” are also defined as someone who has cohabitated
with the victim.150 Marriage also could qualify under a tribe’s domestic or family
laws,151 but these definitions are vague because they do not clearly include twospirit individuals. This ambiguity can be harmful to two-spirited individuals or
same-sex couples who experience domestic violence by their partners. By not
specifically incorporating two-spirited individuals or same-sex couples into the
definition of a qualifying relationship can adversely affect their ability to achieve
justice in tribal courts.
A case from the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in Arizona, provides an example of
how exercising special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction under VAWA can
have an adverse effect on same-sex couples.152 The Pascua Yaqui Tribe received
approval to begin exercising special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction under
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VAWA on February 20, 2014.153 In 2014, a case came before the Pascua Yaqui
Tribal Court that involved two men in a same-sex relationship. The jury acquitted
the defendant because they were not convinced that the individuals were in a
relationship.154 The prosecutor had to prove that a relationship existed between
the offender and the victim to meet VAWA jurisdiction because one individual
was non-Indian. 155 Under 25 U.S.C. Section 1304(a)(2), tribes can exercise
extended VAWA jurisdiction only for domestic violence occurring between
individuals who are in a qualifying relationship. In the Pascua Yaqui case, the
relationship did not meet the statutory language, which states:
[a] current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by
a person whom the victim shares a child in common, by a
person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the
victim as a spouse or intimate partner, or by a person similarly
situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic or family
violence laws of an Indian tribe that jurisdiction over the Indian
where the violation occurs.156
Ultimately, the non-Indian defendant was “extradited to the State of
Oklahoma on an outstanding felony warrant.”157
Although the Pascua Yaqui case was not a total failure of VAWA, this
case does bring up some complex issues regarding the protection of our twospirited tribal members. If the non-Indian defendant had not been extradited to
Oklahoma for an outstanding warrant, would he be back on the reservation still
abusing his partner? What qualifies a same-sex relationship as a “relationship”
under the 2013 Reauthorization of VAWA? These unanswered questions are still
present, and given the high abuse rate of our two-spirited tribal members, there
needs to be clear answers to ensure our tribal courts can provide justice.
Tribal laws have recognized same-sex marriage to grant equal protection
and due process to all tribal members. For example, the Puyallup Tribe passed an
amendment to add a section to its tribal code to legalize same-sex marriage.158
Under Section 7.08.030 of the Puyallup Tribal Code, same-sex marriages are
valid if one of the partners is a member of the Puyallup Tribe, at least eighteen
years old, and obtained a certificate of marriage.159
There are tribes that do not recognize same-sex marriage, but their
customary laws regard these individuals as respected community members who
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guard traditions and stories.160 For example, the Diné Nation considered nádleeh
as someone whose identity exists beyond male and female.161 Because of the dual
role of nádleeh, they were thought to be sacred because they assumed both
masculine and feminine roles within the community.162 Prior to 2005, the Diné
Nation did not specifically prohibit same-sex marriages.163 However, when the
issue of gay marriage reached the national stage, the Diné passed the Diné
Marriage Act of 2005. The Diné Marriage Act invalidated marriage between
same-sex couples.164 Many other tribes have passed similar legislation.165
Other tribes recognize the rights of individuals in same-sex marriages.166
However, the vague language in VAWA does not provide adequate protection for
these couples. If a tribe does not recognize a same-sex marriage, but the
surrounding state does, who has jurisdiction? This vagueness creates open
questions in tribal courts that need to be resolved to protect two-spirit
members. Is there a solution where tribes can utilize customary laws to help a
couple reach a resolution in a domestic dispute? Or must tribes turn away these
domestic violence cases because tribes must abide by the TLOA and VAWA
standards? These questions have yet to be answered.
VAWA was created to “strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise
their sovereign authority to respond to violent crimes against Indian women.”167
Tribes exercise their sovereign authority by integrating their customary laws with
traditional western notions of justice.168 If tribes combine their legal precedence
with VAWA, it can help tribes exercise expanded jurisdiction over same-sex
domestic violence cases or cases that involve two-spirited individuals.
As in earlier legislation and even in the most recent legislation, tribal
customary law is not considered when tribal jurisdiction is expanded. Like TLOA,
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VAWA has areas that call for the incorporation of tribal customary law and
cultural values to ensure tribes can protect all of our Indigenous people.
CONCLUSION
While the recent reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) appears to be a victory for Native women and tribes, there are many
unanswered questions. If “we lose our prayers and ceremonies, we will lose the
foundations of life,”169 and “if we lose those teachings, we will have broken [our]
law.”170 Federal cases and statutes have greatly reduced tribal sovereignty and the
application of tribal customary law. Federal interference into tribal affairs has
increased the presence of western legal concepts and diminished the cultural
foundation of many tribes. The requirements of the Major Crimes Act and the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) began to adversely affect tribes by diminishing
cultural foundations of customary law. If we allow more recent federal legislation
like the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) and VAWA to continue chipping
away at tribes’ cultural foundations, tribal customary laws will fade into obscurity
and threaten the survival of tribes.
In order to continue flourishing, tribes must have the ability to practice
their own customary laws within tribal courts. Federal legislation needs to be
amended to stress the importance of customary law and tribal lay advocates. The
absence of customary law in tribal courts and unanswered questions about federal
legislation like TLOA and VAWA continue to leave our tribal members
unprotected. It is important that we address the unanswered questions such as
incorporation of customary laws, the status of tribal lay advocates, and protection
of two-spirited individuals before we lose more of our tribal members and
customary laws.
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